1973 Communication Sqd. Udorn Air Base Thailand

Operations, was established to meet this Air Staff requirement. Managed by Hq PACAF, with elements at Hq 7AF and 7/13AF, Project CHECO provides a scholarly, "on-going" historical evaluation and documentation of USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in Southeast Asia combat operations. This CHECO report is part of the overall documentation and evaluation which is being accomplished Along with the other CHECO publications, this is an authentic source for an assessment of the effectiveness of USAF airpower in SEA.

While a measure of planning and direction guided the C-130 evaluations at Da Nang, the same was not true of the C-47 ABCCC type operation out of Udorn. No official history exists for the 1966 effort there; what follows was pieced together from interviews conducted with several of the participants. They were in substantial agreement on many of the events and developments; where this was not the case, the text will so indicate. Several of these people had no idea why they were sent to Thailand, and all felt that it was a "shoestring" operation.

Laos wanted some kind of control over airstrikes in Laos and 7AF was concerned that strike aircraft going north could not pick up the ABCCC in Laos (Cricket). Both reasons were credited with having nudged the operation toward exercising a control capability. Briefly, this is how the ABCCC operation in Thailand began.

Crews were briefed at Udorn by CAS personnel and the Tactical Unit Operations Center (TUOC). Orbits were chosen more or less relative to areas where strike activity was planned or anticipated, and crews "picked their way" to the scene.

North Vietnam (NVN). By July 1966, PCS personnel arrived and began to replace the original three-month TDY group.

Control activities and equipment were rudimentary at best. On some of the early missions, the crew chief occupied the copilot seat while one of the pilots went into the back end to work the control radios placed on a table. Gradually, some semblance of order emerged. By approximately July or August, ROLLING THUNDER aircraft began checking in and out while going into RP V. However, F-105's and A-1E's entered and exited NVN at any altitude, 7AF fragged sorties in Laos, and the ABCCC crew controlled them in what they estimated to be the best area. Eventually, intelligence officers exercised some authority over what targets could or could not be hit and communications were established directly with the U.S. Ambassador's office in Vientiane. The control function was further increased with the ability to get. diverts or other aircraft with unexpected ordnance for use in Laos.

EC-130s after the SEA EC-130 force was increased to seven aircraft. _7/

ABCCC as an airborne coordinator was established. With its role thus defined, the operations became a matter of normalizing and improving u p o n ABCCC performance and learning to cope with tasks of increasing scope and responsibility.

The ABCCC flew generally in designated orbits. Numerous tests were conducted to determine the best possible orbits consistent with safety,; assigned control areas, and communications effectiveness. From these established orbits, the ABCCC exercised immediate control of airstrikes. The entire operation evolved from two daylight orbits into an around-the-clock orbit system. Hillsboro orbited near the DMZ contiguous to SVN and controlled STEEL TIGER South (TIGER HOUND) and the TALLY HO sector of RP I. Cricket was positioned farther north in Laos, and controlled STEEL TIGER North, BARREL ROLL, and the rest of RP I. Initially, only Alley Cat relieved the day orbits and was located opposite the DMZ for better night coverage of truck routes in all of STEEL TIGER and RP I. In mid- December 1967, a second night orbit (Moonbeam) was approved. Moonbeam started flying in February 1968, was suspended for modification in May, and resumed operations in August. Hillsboro and Moonbeam were complementary as to orbit area, as were Cricket and Alley Cat. These four orbits generally provided the standard day/night operation and stations were about 30 minutes flying time from Udorn. Beyond this, the commander ordered the most feasible orbit for any critical or special operation. _9/ (Fig. 2.)

Orbit consolidation was attempted in August 1967. A test was conducted to find a single orbit for the entire area of ABCCC responsibility so that available system resources might be used more economically. After numerous orbits were flown at maximum possible altitudes, the conclusion was reached that no single orbit gave adequate coverage and a single orbit should only be used in extreme emergencies. On 15 August 1967, a fifth orbit was tested over the Gulf of Tonkin to determine the feasibility of using an ABCCC to control strikes in RP I, II, III, and IV. A C-130 (Landmark) orbited 40NM off the coast of NVN between the 17th and 18th parallels. Communications and coordination with Task Force 77 proved successful and effective. Landmark did not continue, however, due to shortage of aircraft, congestion over the Gulf, and distance of the station from Udorn. Although abandoned, its success formed one basis for a request for five-more ABCCC systems. _10/

In no case, however, were orbits to be used or planned within range of enemy AAA or SAM's. _ 11/

1968, in BARREL ROLL, when a Raven FAC (0-1) visually detected an enemy convoy estimated at 50 trucks proceeding along Route 7, This information was quickly reported to Cricket, which diverted whatever fueled and armed aircraft were available to the area. Within minutes strike flights got to the target and helped destroy approximately 26 of the trucks._18/ Command and Control Resolved After months of planning to achieve an integrated ABCCC unit, fragmentation was once again a possibility, Before this occurred, however, two new and different views were interjected into the equation--the 7th ACCS Commander and the new 7AF Commander. Two factors were significant in the eventual outcome. On 27 June OSD approved the ABCCC move to Udorn with 497 spaces. Steps had also been taken to pave the way for Thailand country clearance. The total number of people were not to enter the country until clearance was received; however, the Thai government approved the deployment of additional personnel for the ABCCC squadron on 11 October and the ceiling limit was raised to accommodate them. _24/ 

The commander of the 7ACCS "strongly recommended against fragmentation" of people and equipment to "multiple organizations and multiple major command elements." He preferred to have the 7th ACCS package assigned to 7AF; barring that, he recommended assigning the package to 13AF with operational control to 7AF. _25/ The new 7AF Commander was briefed on the PACAF and 7AF position regarding organization and assignment of the 7th ACCS at Udorn. Briefly, the PACAF position was unchanged-- assign the 7th ACCS to 13AF, minus the command/control element which was assigned to Det l, 7AF. With the 7AF Commander providing guidance and direction, two proposals materialized. The first was to assign only the command /control element to 7th.ACCS under 13AF and to retain the original maintenance/support concept. The second was to assign the 7th ACCS package to 13AF with operational control: to 7AF. _26/ These two positions revealed a fundamental shift of position regarding the command/control element. A 7AF Command letter to CINCPACAF supported assigning the command/control element to 7^th ACCS under 13AF, with operational control to 7AF, because of RTG approval for the move and because he wanted the transition to be made "with minimal disruption to unit integrity and mission capability." However, he further recommended retention of the old maintenance concept because it worked well, obviated the need for additional facilities at Udorn which already existed at CCK, kept all support activities under an organization familiar with C-130 operation and reduced the number of people at Udorn "The savings in Thailand headroom and facility construction costs would more than offset TDY costs. . . ._27/

The 13AF Commander considered it “highly desirable that all aspects of (the) Airborne command Post at Udorn be under (a) single commander.” He also thought it essential to “maintain our reputation for credibility with the Bangkok Embassy” and did not consider it prudent to propose another change.

CINCPAC and, in turn, to JCS and OSD for a change in ABCCC beddown, and (3) the desirability of retaining the squadron designation and identifying resources in the SEAITACS program rather than having it commingled with airlift program resources. _ 30/

20September 1968, the future role of the ABCCC was accorded significant attention. Comprehensive system was envisioned in the AWACS concept. USAF planning concepts called for specially designed and equipped aircraft to perform all elements of battle control--deployment, employment, air defense, and direct air support. The report also recommended that an integrated package be included in the same wing/group structure which contained all other command and control aircraft. With all personnel and equipment necessary to do the job, the squadron was to be deployed as an organized unit. Both recommendations above rested on the experience gained in SEA. Other roles envisioned for the ABCCC were as an extension of a ground-based sensor system or of air ground coordination functions, as an integral part of the TACS or an interface with systems of other military services. The blend of past, present, and future was apparent in all recommendations.

USAF resources located at three RTAF bases. The first such attack was on 26 July 1968 against Udorn RTAFB. Subsequently, Ubon RTAFB was attacked on 28 July 1969, 13 Jan 1970, and 4 June 1972, and UTapao RTNAF on 10 January 1972. All attacks occurred during the hours of darkness and all were conducted by small sniper units armed with a variety of explosive devices.